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Abstract— Differential games offer a powerful theoretical
framework for formulating safety and robustness problems in
optimal control. Unfortunately, numerical solution techniques
for general nonlinear dynamical systems scale poorly with state
dimension and are rarely used in applications requiring real-
time computation. For single-agent optimal control problems,
however, local methods based on efficiently solving iterated
approximations with linear dynamics and quadratic costs are
becoming increasingly popular. We take inspiration from one
such method, the iterative linear quadratic regulator (ILQR),
and observe that efficient algorithms also exist to solve multi-
player linear-quadratic games. Whereas ILQR converges to a
local solution of the optimal control problem, if our method
converges it returns a local Nash equilibrium of the differential
game. We benchmark our method in a three-player general-
sum simulated example, in which it takes < 0.75 s to identify
a solution and < 50 ms to solve warm-started subproblems
in a receding horizon. We also demonstrate our approach in
hardware, operating in real-time and following a 10 s receding
horizon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential game theory is a popular framework for
formulating safety, robustness, and human-robot interaction
problems. For example, Turetsky et al. [1] compute a robust
tracking controller by solving a two-player zero-sum game,
and Wang et al. [2] model the behavior of human-driven
vehicles on the road using a general-sum game .
Most classes of differential games have no analytic so-
lution, and many numerical techniques suffer from the so-
called “curse of dimensionality” [3]. Numerical dynamic
programming solutions for general nonlinear systems have
been studied extensively, though primarily in cases with
a priori known objectives and constraints which permit
offline computation, such as automated aerial refueling [4].
Approaches such as [5, 6] which decouple offline game
analysis from online operation are promising. Still, scenarios
with more than two players remain extremely challenging,
and the practical restriction of solving games offline prevents
differential games from being widely used in many applica-
tions of interest, such as autonomous driving.
Like differential games, global solution techniques (i.e.,
those that return global optima) for single-agent optimal
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Fig. 1: Demonstration of the proposed algorithm for a three-player general-
sum game modeling an intersection. Two cars (red and green triangles)
navigate the intersection while a pedestrian (blue triangle) traverses a
crosswalk. Observe how both cars swerve slightly to provide extra clearance
to the pedestrian.
control problems also suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
Recently, however, local methods such as differential dy-
namic programming (DDP) [7] and iterative linear quadratic
regulation (ILQR) [8], which return only local optima, have
become popular [9–11] in the nonlinear model predictive
control and motion planning communities. These methods
repeatedly refine an initial control strategy by efficiently
solving linear-quadratic (LQ) approximations of the problem.
We observe that, just as LQ optimal control problems can
be solved efficiently for a single agent, LQ games afford an
equivalently efficient numerical solution for multiple players.
In this paper, we present an algorithm for computing an
approximate solution to differential games which leverages
the computational efficiency of solving these LQ games.
Like ILQR, our method is local. In the context of differ-
ential games, this means that if our approach converges,
the solution it returns is a local Nash equilibrium under
easily-verified conditions (rather than a local optimum in
ILQR). However, like other local methods for solving games
(e.g., [2]) our approach is not guaranteed to converge from
arbitrary initializations.
The core computational steps of our approach are substan-
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tially similar to those of ILQR, as both algorithms require
linearizing dynamics, quadraticizing costs, and solving a
Riccati equation. For this reason, we believe that our work
will enable and encourage a broad range of planning and
control practitioners already familiar with ILQR to formu-
late problems robustly as differential games and seamlessly
integrate with existing computational tools. For example, in
Fig. 1 we demonstrate our approach in a three-player general-
sum game intended to model traffic at an intersection. In
< 0.75 s, our algorithm converges to a set of strategies which
exhibit non-trivial coordination to avoid collision. These
types of coordinated strategies could be useful for modeling
human behavior, as well as for computing a motion plan for
an autonomous car acting as one of the players.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
Differential games have been widely studied since the
introduction of pursuit-evasion games in [12]. Here, we
survey both zero-sum and general-sum games and discuss
approximate solution techniques. We also summarize itera-
tive linear quadratic methods used both for optimal control
and games and discuss their bearing on this work.
A. Zero-sum games
In zero-sum games, two (groups of) players choose con-
trol strategies to optimize equal and opposite objectives.
Two-player zero-sum games are often formulated through
a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) PDE, e.g. [13–17]. More
complicated games, such as active target defense and multi-
player capture-avoid games are also addressed in a zero-sum
framework in [18, 19] and [20], respectively.
B. General-sum games
Initially formulated in [21, 22], general-sum differen-
tial games generalize zero-sum games to model situa-
tions in which players have competing—but not necessarily
opposite—costs. Like zero-sum games, general-sum games
are characterized by Hamilton-Jacobi equations [21] in which
each player’s Hamiltonian is coupled with other players’.
Solutions to both zero-sum and general-sum games, and
especially games with many players, are generally difficult
to solve numerically. However, efficient methods do exist
for solving games with linear dynamics and quadratic costs,
e.g. [23, 24]. Dockner et al. [25] also characterize classes of
games which admit tractable open loop, rather than feedback,
solutions.
C. Approximation techniques
While general-sum games may be analyzed, in principle,
by solving coupled Hamilton-Jacobi equations [21], doing
so unfortunately requires both exponential time and compu-
tational memory. A number of more tractable approximate
solution techniques have been proposed for zero-sum games,
many of which require linear system dynamics, e.g. [26–29],
or decomposable dynamics [30]. Approximate dynamic pro-
gramming techniques such as [31] are not restricted to linear
dynamics. Still, scalability to online, real-time operation
remains a challenge.
Iterative best response algorithms form another class of ap-
proximate methods for solving general-sum games. Here, in
each iteration every player solves (or approximately solves)
the optimal control problem that results from holding other
players’ strategies fixed. This reduction to a sequence of
optimal control problems is attractive; however, it can also
be computationally inefficient. Still recent work demonstrates
the effectiveness of iterative best response in lane changes
[6] and multi-vehicle racing [2].
Another similarly-motivated class of approximations in-
volves changing the information structure of the game. For
example, Chen et al. [32] solve a multi-player reach-avoid
game by pre-specifying an ordering amongst the players
and allowing earlier players to communicate their intended
strategies to later players. Zhou et al. [33] and Liu et al.
[34] operate in a similar setting, but solve for open-loop
conservative strategies.
D. Iterative linear-quadratic (LQ) methods
Iterative LQ approximation methods are increasingly com-
mon in the robotics and control communities. Our work
builds directly upon the iterative linear-quadratic regula-
tor (ILQR) algorithm [8, 35]. ILQR is closely related to
differential dynamic programming [7, 36], and is widely
used to find local solutions to smooth nonlinear optimal
control problems. ILQR has been demonstrated in a variety
of applications including driving [11], humanoid locomotion
[9], and grasping [10]. There are also many extensions to
ILQR, including trajectory smoothing [37] and constraint
handling via barrier functions [11].
At each iteration, ILQR simulates the full nonlinear system
trajectory, computes a discrete-time linear dynamics approx-
imation and quadratic cost approximation, and solves a LQR
subproblem to generate the next control strategy iterate.
While structurally similar to ILQR, our approach solves a
LQ game at each iteration instead of a LQR problem. This
core idea is related to the sequential linear-quadratic method
of [38, 39], which is restricted to the two-player zero-sum
context. In this paper, we show that LQ approximations
can be applied to N -player, general-sum games, provide a
theoretical characterization of convergence properties, and,
significantly, demonstrate that our approach is faster than
existing approaches and is easily real-time for moderate to
large-scale problems.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a N -player finite horizon general-sum differ-
ential game characterized by system dynamics
x˙ = f(t, x, u1, . . . , uN ), (1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state of the system, and ui ∈ Rmi , i ∈
[N ] ≡ {1, . . . , N} is the control input of player i. Each
player has a cost function Ji defined as an integral of running
costs gi. Ji is understood to depend implicitly upon the state
trajectory x(·), which itself depends upon initial state x(0)
and control signals {uj(·)}:
Ji
(
u1(·), . . . , uN (·)
)
,∫ T
0
gi
(
t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN (t)
)
dt,∀i ∈ [N ]. (2)
We shall presume that f is continuous in t and continu-
ously differentiable in {x, ui} uniformly in t. We shall also
require gi to be twice differentiable in {x, ui} uniformly
in t. Without any practical loss of generality, we shall also
presume that gi ≥ 0.
Ideally, we would like to find time-varying state feedback
control strategies γ∗i ∈ Γi for each player i which constitute
a global Nash equilibrium for the game defined by (1)
and (2). Here, the strategy space Γi for player i is the
set of measurable functions γi : [0, T ] × Rn → Rmi
mapping time and state to player i’s control. Note that,
in this formulation, player i only observes the state of the
system at each time and is unaware of other players’ control
strategies. With a slight abuse of notation Ji(γ1; . . . ; γN ) ≡
Ji
(
γ1(·, x(·)), . . . , γN (·, x(·))
)
, the global Nash equilibrium
is defined as the set of strategies {γi} for which the following
inequalities hold (see, e.g., [24, Chapter 6]):
J∗1 , J1(γ∗1 ; γ∗2 ; . . . ; γ∗N ) ≤ J1(γ1; γ∗2 ; . . . ; γ∗N ),
J∗2 , J2(γ∗1 ; γ∗2 ; . . . ; γ∗N ) ≤ J2(γ∗1 ; γ2; . . . ; γ∗N ),
...
J∗N , JN (γ∗1 ; γ∗2 ; . . . ; γ∗N ) ≤ JN (γ∗1 ; γ∗2 ; . . . ; γN ).

(3)
In (3), the inequalities must hold for all γi ∈ Γi,∀i ∈
[N ]. Informally, a set of feedback strategies (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
N )
is a global Nash equilibrium if no player has a unilateral
incentive to deviate from his/her current strategy.
Since finding a global Nash equilibrium is generally
computationally intensive, in this work, we will be concerned
with finding local Nash equilibria. A local Nash equilibrium
is characterized similarly to (3), except that the inequalities
may only hold for γi ∈ Γ˜i an open subset of Γi, ∀i [40,
Definition 1]. For a detailed characterization of local Nash
equilibria, please refer to [40]. Intuitively, we shall seek
to find strategies for all players such that no player has a
unilateral incentive to make a small deviation from his/her
current strategy. Although a player operating at a local Nash
equilibrium might prefer a very different strategy, restricting
our attention to local equilibria will be computationally
advantageous. Moreover, as we shall see in Section V,
these local equilibria may still involve intricate coordination
between players.
IV. ITERATIVE LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES
We approach the N -player general-sum game (2) with
nonlinear dynamics (1) from the perspective of classical
LQ games. It is well known that equilibrium strategies
for finite-horizon LQ games satisfy coupled Riccati differ-
ential equations. These coupled Riccati equations may be
derived directly from the first order necessary conditions
of optimality for each player [24, Chapter 6], or equiva-
lently by substituting linear dynamics and quadratic running
Algorithm 1: Iterative LQ Games
Input: initial state x(0), control strategies {γ0i }i∈[N ],
time horizon T
Output: converged control strategies {γ∗i }i∈[N ]
1 for iteration k = 1, 2, . . . do
2 ξk ≡ {xˆ(t), uˆi(t)}i∈[N ],t∈[0,t] ←
3 getTrajectory
(
x(0), {γk−1i }
)
;
4 {A(t), Bi(t)} ← linearizeDynamics
(
ξk
)
;
5 {li(t), Qi(t), Rij(t)} ← quadraticizeCost
(
ξk
)
;
6 {γ˜ki } ← solveLQGame
(
7 {A(t), Bi(t), li(t), Qi(t), Rij(t)}
)
;
8 {γki } ← stepToward
({γk−1i , γ˜ki });
9 if converged then
10 return {γki }
costs into the generalized coupled HJ equations [22]. These
coupled differential equations may be solved approximately
in discrete-time using dynamic programming [24]. We will
leverage the existence and computational efficiency of this
discrete-time LQ solution to solve successive approximations
to the original nonlinear non-quadratic game.
A. Iterative LQ game algorithm
Our iterative LQ game approach proceeds in stages, as
summarized in Algorithm 1. We begin with an initial state
x(0) and initial feedback control strategies {γ0i } (or open-
loop controls) for each player i, and integrate the system
forward (line 3 of Algorithm 1) to obtain the current tra-
jectory iterate ξk ≡ {xˆ(t), uˆi(t)}i∈[N ],t∈[0,T ]. Next (line 4)
we obtain a Jacobian linearization of the dynamics f about
trajectory ξk. At each time t ∈ [0, T ] and for arbitrary
states x(t) and controls ui(t) we define deviations from this
trajectory δx(t) = x(t) − xˆ(t) and δui(t) = ui(t) − uˆi(t).
Thus equipped, we compute a continuous-time linear system
approximation about ξk:
˙δx(t) ≈ A(t)δx(t) +
∑
i∈[N ]
Bi(t)δui(t), (4)
where A(t) is the Jacobian Dxˆf
(
t, xˆ(t), uˆ1(t), . . . , uˆN (t)
)
and Bi(t) is likewise Duˆif
(
t, xˆ(t), uˆ1(t), . . . , uˆN (t)
)
.
We also obtain a quadratic approximation to the running
cost gi for each player i (see line 5 of Algorithm 1)
gi
(
t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN (t)
) ≈
gi
(
t, xˆ(t), uˆ1(t), . . . , uˆN (t)
)
+ li(t)
T δx(t)+
1
2
δx(t)TQi(t)δx(t) +
1
2
∑
j∈[N ]
δuj(t)
TRijδuj(t), (5)
where vector li(t) is the gradient Dxˆgi(t, . . . ), and ma-
trices Qi and {Rij} are Hessians D2xˆxˆgi(t, . . . ) and
D2uˆj uˆjgi(t, . . . ), respectively.
Thus, we have constructed a finite-horizon continuous-
time LQ game, which may be solved via coupled Riccati
differential equations [24, 41]. This results in a new set
of candidate feedback strategies {γ˜ki } which constitute a
feedback (global) Nash equilibrium of the LQ game [24]. In
fact, these feedback strategies are affine maps of the form:
γ˜ki
(
t, x(t)
)
= uˆi(t)− P ki (t)δx(t)− αki (t), (6)
with gains P ki (t) ∈ Rmi×n and affine terms αki (t) ∈ Rmi .
However, we find that choosing γki = γ˜
k
i often diverges
because the trajectory resulting from the {γ˜i} is far enough
from the current trajectory iterate ξk that the dynamics
linearizations (Algorithm 1, line 4) and cost quadraticizations
(line 5) no longer hold. As in ILQR [42], to improve
convergence, we take only a small step in the “direction” of
γ˜ki . More precisely, for some choice of step size η ∈ (0, 1],
we set
γki
(
t, x(t)
)
= uˆi(t)− P ki (t)δx(t)− ηαki (t), (7)
which corresponds to line 8 in Algorithm 1. Note that at
t = 0, δx(0) = 0 and γki
(
0, x(0)
)
= uˆi(0)− ηαki (0). Thus,
taking η = 0, we have γki
(
t, x(t)
)
= uˆi(t) (which may
be verified recursively). That is, when η = 0 we recover
the open-loop controls from the previous iterate, and hence
x(t) = xˆ(t). Taking η = 1, we recover the LQ solution in
(6). Similar logic implies the following lemma, which we
will use shortly in the proof of our main theoretical result.
Lemma 1: Suppose that trajectory ξ∗ is a fixed point of
Algorithm 1, with η 6= 0. Then, the converged affine terms
{α∗i (t)} must all be identically zero for all time.
In ILQR, it is common to perform an Armijo line-search
over step size η to ensure a sufficient decrease in cost at every
iteration, and thereby improve convergence (e.g., [42]). In the
context of a noncooperative game, however, line-searching
to decrease “cost” does not make sense, as costs {Ji} may
conflict. While we believe this to be a rich topic of future
research, practically we find that our algorithm typically
converges for a fixed, small step size (e.g. η = 0.01).
Heuristically decaying step size with each iteration k or line-
searching until ‖ξk − ξk−1‖ is smaller than a threshold are
also promising alternatives.
B. Convergence
Like other local methods (e.g., [2]), our approach is
not guaranteed to converge to a fixed strategy for each
player. However, presuming that our algorithm does converge
for a particular problem instantiation, Theorem 1 provides
conditions for which the control signals {uˆ∗i (·)} associated
with the converged strategies {γi} constitute a local Nash
equilibrium in open-loop strategies. The feedback controllers
{γi} may be understood as stabilizing about this open-loop
equilibrium point.
Theorem 1: (Characterization of Fixed Points) Suppose
that Algorithm 1 converges to feedback controllers {γ∗i }, and
let ξ∗ = {xˆ∗(·), uˆ∗i (·)} and {J∗i } respectively be the trajec-
tory and costs corresponding to the {γ∗i } and initial condition
x(0). If the quadratic approximation of each player’s running
cost gi about ξ∗ is convex in state x and controls ui (i.e.,
Qi(t), Rij(t)  0,∀t ∈ [0, T ]), then the open-loop control
signals {uˆ∗i (·)} constitute a local Nash equilibrium in open-
loop strategies for the game specified by dynamics (1) and
costs (2). That is, the {u∗i (·)} satisfy (3) locally on the space
of time-varying but state-independent strategies.
Proof: It suffices to show, without loss of general-
ity, that small perturbations in player 1’s control signal
u1(·) away from u∗1(·) result in higher cost J¯1(γ1) ,
J1(γ1; γ
∗
2 ; . . . ; γ
∗
N ) ≥ J∗1 , if Q1(·), R1j(·)  0. The proof
follows two steps: first, we prove the result for the linearized
system (4), then we invoke standard results from system
theory on sensitivity to extend the proof to the nonlinear
system.
Suppose Q1(·), R1j(·)  0; this implies that g1 is convex
in x(t), {ui(t)},∀t in the neighborhood of ξ∗. However, the
state at time t, x(t), depends upon control at all prior times
τ < t. We shall first show that J¯1 is convex in u1 near u∗1
for trajectories of the Jacobian linearization about ξ∗ (4).
Fixing other players’ control signals {u∗i 6=1(·)}, the state
δxlin(t) (and hence xlin(t)) of the resulting affine time-
varying system is affine in δu1(τ) (and hence in u1(τ))
∀τ ∈ [0, t] [43]. Convex functions composed with affine
functions are still convex, and integrals of nonnegative con-
vex functions are also convex; hence, J¯1 is also convex in
u1(·) in the neighborhood of u∗1(·) for trajectories of the
linearized system.
Additionally, we know that the converged strategies {γ∗i }
comprise a fixed point of Algorithm 1. By Lemma 1, α∗1(·) ≡
0
δxlin(0) = 0=⇒ γ∗1 (t, xlin(t)) = u∗1(t),∀t. Moreover, the {γ∗i }
comprise the unique global Nash equilibrium of the LQ
approximation (about ξ∗) to the original game. Hence, J¯1
has a local minimum at u∗1 for the linearized dynamics.
It remains to argue that these results extend to trajectories
of the nonlinear system (1). Fortunately, since f ∈ C1 we
know that trajectories of the nonlinear system vary smoothly
with inputs {ui}. Moreover, δx(0) = 0, so trajectories of
f can be driven arbitrarily closely to trajectories of the
linearized system. Formally, ∀ > 0,∃δ > 0 such that
‖u1(t) − u∗1(t)‖ < δ =⇒ ‖x(t) − xlin(t)‖ < , ∀t.
Taking  sufficiently small, this implies that the difference in
cost J¯1 for trajectories of the nonlinear system can also be
made arbitrarily close to that for trajectories of the linearized
system. Thus, our analysis of the linearized system holds
locally for the nonlinear dynamics.
We offer further interpretation of Theorem 1 below.
Remark 1: This characterization of the fixed points as
potentially local Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies is
roughly equivalent to the characterization of the convergence
of other local methods for solving differential games, such
as iterated best response, e.g., [2, Theorem 1].
Remark 2: The condition that {Qi(t), Rij(t)} be
nonnegative-definite is a common requirement in general-
sum LQ games. However, Bas¸ar and Olsder [24, Remark
6.4] remark that nonnegative-definiteness is sufficient,
but not necessary, for the correctness of the LQ game
solution; indeed, it is never satisfied in a zero-sum game.
We conjecture that the positive-definiteness condition in
Fig. 2: Three-player general-sum game which models traffic at an intersection on a time horizon T = 5 s with time discretization ∆t = 0.1 s. Two cars
(red and green triangles) and a pedestrian (blue triangle) wish to navigate the intersection while avoiding collision. (Left) Green car seeks the lane center
and then swerves slightly to avoid the pedestrian. (Center) Red car weaves in front of the green car and slows slightly to allow the pedestrian to pass.
(Right) Red car swerves left to give pedestrian a wide berth.
Theorem 1 may also be sufficient, but not necessary.
Note: Although we have presented our algorithm in
continuous-time, in practice, we solve the coupled Riccati
equations analytically in discrete-time via dynamic program-
ming. Please refer to [24, Corollary 6.1] for a full derivation.
To discretize time at resolution ∆t, we employ Runge-Kutta
integration of nonlinear dynamics (1) with a zero-order hold
for control input over each time interval ∆t. That is, we
numerically compute:
xˆ(t+ ∆t) = xˆ(t)+
∫ t+∆t
t
f(s, xˆ(s), uˆ1(s), . . . , uˆN (s))ds
where uˆi(s) = γk−1i
(
t, xˆ(t)
)
,∀i ∈ [N ], and
xˆ(0) = x(0). (8)
C. Computational complexity and runtime
The per-iteration computational complexity of our ap-
proach is comparable to that of ILQR, and scales modestly
with the number of players, N . Specifically, at each iteration,
we first linearize system dynamics about ξk. Presuming that
the state dimension n is larger than the control dimension mi
for each player, linearization requires computing O(n2) par-
tial derivatives at each time step (which also holds for ILQR).
We also quadraticize costs, which requires O(Nn2) partial
derivatives at each time step (compared to O(n2) for ILQR).
Finally, solving the coupled Riccati equations of the resulting
LQ game at each time step has complexity O(N3n3), which
may be verified by inspecting [24, Corollary 6.1] (for ILQR,
this complexity is O(n3)).
Total algorithmic complexity depends upon the number
of iterations, which we currently have no theory to bound.
However, empirical results1 are extremely promising. For
the three-player 14-state game described in Section V-A,
each iteration takes < 8 ms and the entire game can be
solved from a zero initialization (P 0i (·) = 0, α0i (·) = 0) in
1Code available at: github.com/HJReachability/ilqgames
< 750 ms. Moreover, receding horizon invocations warm-
started every 100 ms can be solved in < 50 (and often < 20)
ms. All computation times are reported for single-threaded
operation on a 2017 MacBook Pro with a 2.8 GHz Intel Core
i7 CPU. For reference, the iterative best response scheme of
[44] reports solving a receding horizon two-player zero-sum
racing game at 2 Hz, and the method of [39] reportedly
takes several minutes to converge for a different two-player
zero-sum example. The dynamics and costs in both cases
differ from those in Section V (or are not clearly reported);
nonetheless, the runtime of our approach compares favorably.
V. EXAMPLES
In this section, we demonstrate our algorithm experimen-
tally in three-player noncooperative settings, both in software
simulation and hardware.
A. Three-player intersection (software)
We begin by testing our algorithm in software simulation.
As shown in Fig. 2, we consider an intersection with two
cars and one pedestrian, all of which must cross paths to
reach desired goal locations. We use a time horizon of 5 s
and a time discretization of 100 ms. We model collision-
avoiding interactions with semi-quadratic penalties on the
pairwise distances between players. We assign asymmetric
weights to the different players, so that the two cars are
more strongly penalized for near-misses and therefore bear
a greater burden for taking evasive action. Additionally, we
assign each player a quadratic penalty for distance to his/her
goal location, and cars are penalized quadratically for their
distance to the appropriate lane center.
We model the cars’ dynamics using a classical 5D bicycle
model (left), and model the pedestrian using a 4D unicycle
Robot goal Human goals
(a) (e)(d)(b) (c)
Fig. 3: Time-lapse of a hardware demonstration of Algorithm 1. We model the interaction of a holonomic robot (blue triangle) and two pedestrians (purple
and red triangles) using a differential game in which each agent wishes to reach a goal location while maintaining sufficient distance from other agents. Our
algorithm solves receding horizon instantiations of this game in real-time, and successfully plans and executes interactive collision-avoiding maneuvers.
Planned (and predicted) trajectories are shown in blue (robot), purple, and red (pedestrians).
model (right):
x˙
y˙
θ˙
φ˙
v˙
 =

v cos θ
v sin θ
v tan(φ)/L
ψ
a
 ,

x˙
y˙
θ˙
v˙
 =

v cos θ
v sin θ
ω
a
 (9)
where the state variables x, y, θ, φ, v represent the (x, y)
position of center of the (rear) axle, the heading relative to
the positive x-axis, the front wheel angle, and speed, respec-
tively. The car is controlled by front wheel turning rate ψ and
tangential acceleration a, while the unicycle is controlled by
angular rate ω and tangential acceleration a. L is the distance
between the cars’ front and rear axles. Together, the state of
the three-player game is 14-dimensional.
Fig. 2 shows a time-lapse of the converged solution
identified by our algorithm. While this may or may not be
a global Nash equilibrium, it certainly exhibits nontrivial
coordination among the players, and with careful choice of
costs satisfies the sufficient conditions for being an open-loop
local Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1). Observe how, between
0 ≤ t ≤ 0.8 s (left panel), the green car initially seeks the
lane center to minimize its cost, but then turns slightly to
avoid the pedestrian (blue). Between 0.8 ≤ t ≤ 1.5 s (center
panel), the red car turns slightly right to pass in front of the
green car, and then slows and begins to turn left to give the
pedestrian time to cross. Finally (right panel), the red car
turns left to give the pedestrian a wide berth.
B. Receding horizon motion planning (hardware)
We next implement Algorithm 1 within the Robot Op-
erating System framework, and evaluate it in a real-time
hardware test. Here, we set up a game in which a TurtleBot
2 holonomic ground robot and two pedestrians seek to cross
a room as quickly as possible while maintaining > 1 m
separation between all agents. We model the robot as a 4D
unicycle (9) and the pedestrians as 3D Dubins cars moving
at constant speed v:x˙y˙
θ˙
 =
v cos θv sin θ
ω
 . (10)
We use a similar cost structure as in Section V-A, and
re-solve the game in a 10 s receding horizon with time
discretization of 100 ms, replanning every 250 ms. We
gather state information for all agents using a motion capture
system. Fig. 3 shows a time-lapse of a typical interaction. In-
ternally, we initialize Algorithm 1 with all agents’ strategies
identically zero (i.e., P 0i (·), α0i (·) ≡ 0), and warm-start each
successive receding horizon invocation with the previous
solution. Initially, in frame (a) Algorithm 1 identifies a set
of strategies which steer each agent to their respective goals
while maintaining comfortable separation. Of course, the
pedestrians do not actually follow these precise trajectories;
hence later receding horizon invocations converge to slightly
different strategies. In fact, between frames (c) and (d) the
red pedestrian makes an unanticipated sharp right-hand turn,
which forces the (blue) robot to stay to the right of its
previous plan and then turn left in order to maintain sufficient
separation between itself and both pedestrians. We note that
our assumed cost structure models all agents as wishing
to avoid collision; hence the resulting strategies may be
less conservative than those that would arise from a non-
game-theoretic motion planning approach. As our primary
objective is to demonstrate the real-time performance of
Algorithm 1, we leave a more complete study of agent intent
modeling and its impact on Nash equilibria for future work.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have presented a novel algorithm for finding lo-
cal Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum differential
games. Our approach is closely related on the popular
iterative linear quadratic regulator (ILQR) algorithm [8],
and offers a relatively straightforward way for practitioners
already using ILQR to add robustness to their systems and
model multi-agent interactions with differential games. We
demonstrated our method in a 14-dimensional three-player
example, in which it finds an interactive solution to a traffic
scenario. We also demonstrated our approach in a hardware
test, in which it operates in real-time following a receding
horizon.
There are several other approaches to identifying local
Nash equilibria in differential games, e.g. iterative best
response [2]. We have shown the relative computational ef-
ficiency of our approach. However, quantitatively comparing
the equilibria identified by these algorithms is challenging
because, in arbitrary general-sum games, different players
may prefer different equilibria. Studying the qualitative dif-
ferences in these equilibria is an important direction of future
research.
While we identify sufficient conditions for converged
strategies to be a local Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1), our
approach is not guaranteed to convergence from arbitrary
initializations. However, in our experience convergence can
almost always be achieved with a sufficiently small step
size. Future work will be seek a theoretical explanation of
this empirical property. Another important point of practical
concern, e.g. in motion planning, is how to estimate appro-
priate cost functions gi for each player. We hope to direct
future work in this direction. Finally, it will also be critical
to develop a theory for understanding the topology of the
local Nash equilibria identified by our algorithm, and their
sensitivity to both misspecified objectives and sub-optimal
play.
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